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PHILIP D. REED PROFESSORSHIP IN CIIL
JUSTICE AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
THE FUTURE OF CLASS ACTIONS IN
MASS TORT CASES:
A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION.
MODERATOR
Stephen A. Saltzburg**
PANELISTS
Hon. Edward R. Becker*%*
Hon. Alicenzarie H. Stotlert
Debra M. Torres, Esq.t
Hon. Jack B. Weinsteintt
Melvyn L Weiss, Esq.#
PROFESSOR CAPRA: My name is Dan Capra. I have the honor
of occupying the Philip Reed Chair in Civil Justice Reform. The goal
of the Chair is to promote an interchange of ideas about the civil jus-
tice system, possible areas of reform, problem areas and how to solve
them.
It is my pleasure to welcome you today to a roundtable discussion
on the future of class actions. The class action has held a primary
place in our system of civil justice since the amendments to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23 in 1966.
The paradigm class action, of course, is one that gives relief to indi-
vidual claimants who would not find it cost-effective to bring individ-
ual actions. But lately, questions about the efficacy and fairness of
class actions have arisen from both sides of the political spectrum. On
the one hand, some question whether the class action device shouldn't
be used more broadly to reach a global termination of mass litigation,
cost-effectively to the courts. That is, on the one hand, shouldn't the
class action device be expanded to provide a more effective proce-
* The Roundtable Discussion was held on September 25, 1997, at Fordham
University School of Law.
** Howrey Professor of Trial Advocacy, Litigation and Professional
Responsibility, George Washington University School of Law.
*** Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
" United States District Judge, Central District of California; Chair, Judicial
Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.
Partner, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, New York.
-t Senior United States District Judge, Eastern District of New York.
#t Partner, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, New York.
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dural tool with which to achieve civil justice? On the other hand,
some have expressed concern that the class action, even in its para-
digm form, has basically become an engine for lawyers' fees and not
for civil justice.
The Supreme Court late last Term entered the fray to some extent
when asked to review the certification of an asbestos class action. The
class, in a case originally called Georgine,' was certified for the pur-
pose of reaching a global settlement of current and future asbestos
claims, including the claims of those who did not know they were in-
jured at the time of the settlement.
Challenges were made both to the ethics of the plaintiffs' lawyers, in
terms of representing a disparate class of conflicting interests,2 and
also to whether Rule 23 permits what has come to be known as settle-
ment classes-classes that are basically certified for settlement pur-
poses only, and not for the litigation of class claims.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a comprehensive opinion,
held that the class could not be certified under Rule 23.3 In the Third
Circuit's view, the plaintiffs' claims could not be tried as a class action,
given the disparate interests of the class; therefore, it could not be
settled as a class action. The Third Circuit reasoned that the class ac-
tion device could not be used as a judicial imprimatur to basically en-
force what was an agreement between the defendant and the
plaintiff's lawyers.
The Supreme Court, in the case now known as Amchem,4 basically
agreed with the Third Circuit's analysis and held that the settlement
class could not be certified under Rule 23. However, there are
enough ambiguities in the opinion to give food for thought to what
that opinion means. More broadly, the Amchem opinion warrants
consideration of the propriety of class actions in general, and which
form of class action is appropriate for achieving an efficient and fair
resolution of claims.
It is, therefore, an appropriate time to assess the future of class ac-
tions in light of Amchem, and the panel we have assembled is uniquely
qualified to do so. It is my pleasure to introduce them now, in alpha-
betical order.
Judge Edward Becker, of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, was
the author of the Third Circuit's opinion in Georgine that was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Amchem. He is renowned for the
quality and cogency of his opinions, especially in the areas of civil pro-
cedure and evidence. His opinion in United States v. Downing' on the
1. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
2. See Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 469 (1994) [hereinafter Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas].
3. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 626.
4. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
5. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
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admissibility of expert testimony was essentially adopted by the
Supreme Court in the landmark opinion of Daubert v. Merrell Dow.6
Judge Becker is a member of the American Law Institute and has
authored many law review articles.
Judge Alicemarie Stotler is a District Judge on the United States
District Court of the Central District of California. Judge Stotler
holds the important and prestigious position of Chair of the Judicial
Conference Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
which has been considering the possibility of amendments to Rule 23.
Judge Stotler is a member of the American Law Institute and of the
Executive Committee of the National Conference of Federal Judges.
Debra Torres is a partner in the Litigation Department of Fried,
Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, where she handles a variety of ma-
jor corporate and commercial litigation. She recently represented
Lloyd's of London in a complex litigation brought by state securities
regulators. Ms. Torres is Vice Chair of the ABA Corporate Litigation
Group Subcommittee on Derivative Actions.
Judge Jack Weinstein is a Senior District Judge for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York. Judge Weinstein has presided over some of the
most famous and complex litigations of our time, including, of course,
the Agent Orange class action.7 Judge Weinstein is the author of
many books, articles, and treatises, including Weinstein and Berger on
Evidence,' which has defined much of the thinking in the federal
courts on evidence law.
Melvyn Weiss is a senior partner and co-founder of the law firm of
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, one of the top law firms in
the country prosecuting plaintiffs' class actions. The National Law
Journal recently recognized Mr. Weiss as one of the country's leading
plaintiffs' lawyers in securities, insurance, environmental, and con-
sumer class actions.9
Our moderator today is my friend, colleague, and co-author, Profes-
sor Stephen Saltzburg, the Howrey Professor of Trial Advocacy, Liti-
gation and Professional Responsibility at George Washington
University School of Law. Professor Saltzburg is a nationally re-
nowned scholar in the fields of evidence, civil procedure, and criminal
procedure. He has also served as a special master in several class ac-
tions in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
One final note by way of introduction. While the Amchem case
dealt with a mass tort claim, we thought it appropriate, in light of the
fact that the issues discussed in Amchem go beyond the mass tort con-
6. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
7. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
8. Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger. Weinstein's Evidence (Joseph M.
McLaughlin ed., 1997).
9. 100 Most Influential Lawyers, Nat'l LJ., Apr. 28, 1997, at C4.
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text, to discuss more broadly the future of class actions in general after
Amchem. I leave this broad and difficult topic in the capable hands of
Professor Saltzburg.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Thank you, Dan.
We have, I hope, an interesting format for you today: No
speeches-at least no planned speeches. My job is supposed to be to
moderate and control this panel. I have tried this before, and, with
three federal judges and Mel Weiss and Debra Torres, I think it is
going to be impossible. But what I am going to try to do is make sure
that certain issues we wanted to get talked about do get talked about.
We are going to be talking about class actions of all sorts. We are
going to talk a little bit about the '95 Securities Reform Act,1" what it
did to securities class actions in particular, what impact congressional
action tends to have, and whether we sometimes get unintended con-
sequences that are worse rather than better.
I should also say that we will go with a roundtable discussion panel
and then we will open the floor up for your questions, your comments,
and discussion. We want this to be interactive. We are here to gener-
ate some ideas, some thoughts about where the law may go, where it
ought to go. And the panel will have some ideas and you will have
some ideas, and together we hope that by the end of the day we will
have advanced our thinking, and yours, about class actions.
To begin, Judge Becker, if I could ask you this question-and I also
want to ask Judge Weinstein the same question-if you go back thirty
years, you do not find in the cases nearly the number of class actions
involving torts, as we have broadly defined it; you do not find the
kinds of cases that suddenly seem to be emerging everywhere,
whether it is breast implants, penile implants, whether it is the tobacco
cases, whether it is asbestos. We did not have Dalkon Shield kinds of
cases back in the 1960s. In fact, in 1966 the Advisory Committee
said-
JUDGE BECKER: The Advisory Committee Note raised a ques-
tion as to whether or not Rule 23 was suitable for mass torts at all.1
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: What happened? I mean, why do
we now have so many of these cases, and why do we confront an issue
that was not even on the radar screen as recently as the 1966
amendments?
JUDGE BECKER: Those of us on this panel have grown up pro-
fessionally in an age where people in so many areas have turned to the
courts for solutions rather than to the legislatures. While the area of
mass torts has not generally been thought of in the same terms as
many of the public law litigation areas, I think it really is another ex-
10. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78).
11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendment.
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ample of how social problems have found their way to the courts.
Also, law schools like Fordham turn out resourceful lawyers who have
to find solutions for problems.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Judge Weinstein, if I can frame the
same question to you, but with a little twist on it. Years ago--I don't
know if you remember this-you were down in Charlottesville and
there was a Metropolitan Chief Judges Panel. This was at a time when
there was a different political administration in Washington, D.C., and
our students, a lot of them at the University of Virginia then, kept
asking the same question. There were four of you on a panel, four
metropolitan chief judges. They said, "Do you think that we are too
litigious, that there are too many lawsuits in the United States?" They
really expected the response to be "Yes." In fact, each of the four of
you said, "The problem we have in the United States is we do not
have lawyers representing enough people whose rights have been vio-
lated and we are under-represented rather than being over-litigious."
I wonder, is the fact that lawyers like Mel Weiss are wvilling to bring
actions on behalf of a whole lot of people-and other lawyers-in the
tort area, is this something that, as Judge Becker has indicated, we
basically ought to regard as partly a good as well as an evil?
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: I don't want to say anything about Mel
Weiss because I have to face him in negotiations, and it is a grueling
process. But no, I do not think it is the lawyers or the law schools. I
think it is our society. It is a much more compassionate, understand-
ing, and democratic society.
I have just prepared lectures for China and Chinese judges. By con-
trast with our American rule of law, you have a society that does not
care as much about individual rights and considers them of marginal
utility, and there is no legal structure that will enforce individual
rights. China has mass disasters but not mass torts and effective legal
redress, and as a result their people suffer more than do ours.
Since World War II, our society, and the concept we have of individ-
uals and their rights, has changed enormously, whether it is African-
Americans in the 1954 Brown case,1 2 or torts, or securities-that
started in the 1930s, of course. What we now have is a much more
democratic society-not completely successful of course-where we
are concerned with every individual's rights, not just those of the rich,
not just those of the powerful. We really try to be serious about eve-
rybody having rights and everybody having procedural methods of en-
forcing those rights.
When you have that situation and you have an infrastructure which
has developed of lawyers and judges and legal systems that can en-
force those rights, you are going to have more litigation, and you are
going to have more complex litigation, because our society, our eco-
12. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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nomics, our technology, and our sociology are so enormously com-
plex. This is just a reflection of the maturing, I think, of American
society, which is very threatening to some people who would prefer to
preserve pristinely what happened many years ago. Openness to
change is, I think, the very glory of American democracy. I am de-
lighted with all of this hurly-burly. I am only sorry that I am 76 now
and I cannot watch it develop for another hundred years. It is going
to be a terrific twenty-first century for law students.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Judge Stotler, let me ask you a
question about class actions in general. It does not take a really close
case-watcher to note that, ever since Georgine and Amchem, every
week you find district courts denying class certifications in cases
where several years ago judges might have been willing to try to figure
out a way to entertain them. Are the courts becoming more wary, in
your judgment, about class actions and their ability to handle large
numbers of people in litigation?
JUDGE STOTLER: I think your perception is quite right. I think
if there was one word to distill the result of the Amchem decision, and
if I could depict it graphically, it would probably be highlighted in
yellow, all caps, bold, and italicized, saying "CA UTION." It seems to
me the upshot of the Amchem opinion is to tell the district judge-and
again, the context has to be kept firmly in mind-but I think the con-
text tells the district judge to be very careful about all of those consid-
erations that currently appear in Rule 23.
As you know, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee has been work-
ing on some proposed changes-that is actually noted by Justice Gins-
burg in her opinion13-and so I think that there is a strong warning
there. It certainly was a part of the Third Circuit's opinion that Judge
Becker authored. 14
So I cannot speak for all district judges, but I can certainly say that I
feel duty bound to examine much more closely all of the ramifications
that were spelled out in the Amchem opinion before certifying a class
action.
JUDGE BECKER: Professor Saltzburg, if I can add, the syndrome
is kind of like what happened after the Supreme Court's Celotex sum-
mary judgment trilogy: Celotex,15 Matsushita,6 and Anderson v. Lib-
erty Lobby. 7 Before that time you would rarely see the grant of
summary judgment, but since that time it has been a lot easier to get
summary judgment. I think it is the same kind of thing at work. It is
true that week after week you see district judges denying class
certification.
13. See Amchern Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997).
14. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1996).
15. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
16. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
17. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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MS. TORRES: I can tell you-from the point of view of someone
whose practice is largely defense-oriented-for years, particularly in
securities class actions, opposing class certification often seemed like a
futile effort that was not worth the bother. But the reaction amongst
my colleagues to the Amchem decision is very much that that needs to
be re-thought and that there are issues now that may make opposing
class certification worthwhile.
MR. WEISS: You might get what you asked for.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Let me ask Mel Weiss a question.
There is some interesting data that came out after the Securities Act
Congress passed in 1995,18 trying to make securities class actions more
difficult to bring. I will not go into all the details, but for those of you
who don't practice in this area, this '95 statute provides a heightened
pleading standard with respect to scienter on the part of corporate of-
ficials;19 it provides a Rule 11 threat for plaintiff's lawyers at the end
of a case;2' and it basically denies discovery when there is a motion to
dismiss pending.2 ' It makes it more difficult, I think-you would say
that, wouldn't you, Debra?-for plaintiffs' lawyers.
MS. TORRES: Yes.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: In 1996, the year after the statute
was passed, Mel, the statistics that were then generated showed that
26 percent of all class actions in the securities field had moved to state
court. In 1997, the statistics show they moved back to federal court.
Do you think that the Supreme Court decision in Amchem, this reac-
tion we are seeing of federal judges taking a much harder look at class
action, and the statute you now face as an obstacle in the securities
area, are going to result in a movement to bring cases in state court
rather than federal court?
MR. WEISS: Yes, I think that there will be more cases filed in the
state courts. The Supreme Court has ruled that class actions may be
settled in state court, and releases given that would release claims that
could only be brought in federal court. So the Court has opened the
door to the defendants to get global relief in a state court case, even
though there are claims that could only be brought in their original
form in the federal courts.
I also think that the state court judges are becoming more educated
in how to handle complex cases. But they do not have the staff to
handle them yet, and it is really a difficult job for most state court
judges. When they see a nationwide class action, like some of these
insurance marketing fraud cases I am bringing, it is a scary prospect
for them.
18. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. §§ 77, 78).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2).
20. I& §§ 77z-1(c).
21. Id § § 77z-1(b)(1).
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Now, the interesting thing we have going on here is that the defend-
ants' bar planted the seeds that later cut against what they wanted to
do. By fighting the class certification issue at the beginning of the
case, they created sufficient law for judges like Judge Becker to adopt
at the circuit court level when they finally come up for review in a
settlement context. They sort of created their own misery.
What I said before to one of the panelists is that very frequently the
circuit courts get these issues long after the practicing bar has lived
with them and has gone through several iterations of experience that
led them to a place that the circuit courts do not realize they've ar-
rived at.
By the time Georgine came to Judge Becker, the defendants to-
gether with the plaintiffs wanted class certification to achieve a global
settlement. Five, six, or eight years earlier, the defendants were on
the other side of the plaintiffs, fighting against them on the class certi-
fication. Now, as I mentioned to Debra Torres, you got what you
asked for, which is a decision saying it is harder to get a class certified.
This is also the product, I think, of a political thing that is going on
in our society. It is something that Judge Weinstein probably will re-
coil from-but there has been a lot of lawyer-bashing going on. Presi-
dent Bush, in a speech before the Republican Convention, made
derogatory remarks about lawyers. Vice President Quayle picked up
on it. The importance of access to the courts has been demeaned in
our society. The media has picked up on trashing litigation results and
making it appear as if it is a system out of control.
Ironically, this is all happening in our society at a time when other
societies relish what we have more than anything else you can imag-
ine. Judge Weinstein mentioned China. I just spent a week in Salz-
burg, Austria, with Justice Breyer and others, teaching fellows from 38
different countries. My job was to teach them about class and com-
plex litigation. I cannot tell you what positive response I got from
people all over the world, saying, "Why can't we have this kind of
access to the courts in our societies so that we can level the playing
field for victims against wrongdoers?"
We are going through, I think, a very serious political crossroads on
these issues in this country and I think we may as well recognize that.
JUDGE STOTLER: Well, Congress wants to always have its say
on that subject. I notice that there is a bill pending now that would
preclude bringing securities actions in the state courts.22
MR. WEISS: Right.
JUDGE STOTLER: So it looks as though there is the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of '95, on the one hand, but now there
is an effort to strip the states of having any jurisdiction in that regard.
22. Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1653, 105th Cong.
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So it very much is in the political throes and I think your observations
are very accurate.
MR. WEISS: And not only that, but some of the leading liberal
Democrats are promoters of that bill.
JUDGE STOTLER: Absolutely.
MR. WEISS: Look what happened with the tobacco settlement.
The very first bill proposed in the Senate was to limit legal fees. They
did not look at anything else but how much the lawyers were making.
That was the big issue that they focused on. It is clearly political.
MS. TORRES: Mel points out that the defense bar is sometimes
schizophrenic about what it wants in the context of class certification.
Depending on where you think the case is going to go and what you
think will happen if a motion for class certification is denied early on,
you might want to fight class certification. If you are trying to settle a
big complex case and you want to get certainty about what your liabil-
ity is and is not, and to whom, at that point a defense lawyer wants a
class to be as broad as possible.
The difficulty really arises, I think, much more so in the mass torts
situation than in a securities case, where the parameters of the class
are much more finite. How do you reconcile the need to establish
certainty-which is part of what induces a corporate defendant to be
willing to settle a case and say, "Okay, I am going to put up this
money, and in return for that I want to know that is all the money I
am ever going to have to put up in connection with these disputes"-
with the fact that the interests of the various people you are trying to
compensate may not really be that similar?
That, I think, is the real difference between torts and securities ac-
tions. In securities actions the class, however big it is, is pretty finite
and the nature of the injury is relatively similar, whereas in tort situa-
tions that may not be the case.
JUDGE BECKER: I just want to add what now becomes a note of
agreement with Debra Torres. To identify the issue, the problem is
not in securities class action litigation. There never was a problem in
securities class action litigation. The Securities Litigation Reform Act
was nothing but mischief. Every time Congress enacts a pleading stat-
ute or enacts a Rule of Procedure, like they have done with evidence,
they just mess things up and they just make things more complicated.
I do not perceive any new basis to undermine securities class ac-
tions. I think they work fine. The problem, as Debra Torres sug-
gested, is in the mass tort area and in the consumer area. There you
have classes running into millions and tens of millions-and maybe
hundreds of millions, like the tobacco cases, like the asbestos cases-
and there is where we've got a problem in terms of where we are
going. In the wake of Ainchem, the future of sprawling classes is in
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doubt. When Justice Ginsburg talked about sprawling classes, 3 she
was talking about future classes and classes that were essentially not
cohesive, and they will not likely pass muster.
You do have classes which are a little more cohesive, but because
when you are talking about those, either consumer cases or mass tort
cases-unlike securities cases, which are based on a federal statute,
these are based on state laws-given the difference in laws among
thirty or forty states, you have this tremendous choice-of-law problem.
Because of the problems I identified and that the Supreme Court
identified, what lawyers are now trying to do is to get away from Rule
23(b)(3). 4 In some cases, they are trying to convert many of them
into a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) action,25 on the theory that there is a limited
fund-and then there is always a big fight over whether there is a
limited fund. Or they are trying to convert them into Rule 23(b)(2)
classes.26 So long as they can find some injunctive aspects, some equi-
table aspects to it, they say, "Well, it's a (b)(2) case." And they want
declaratory or injunctive relief-"and, by the way, there is a little bit
of damages here."
Well, if you look at it, sometimes the damage claims just swallow
everything up. But that way counsel gets away from some of the stric-
23. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249 (1997).
24. Rule 23(a) requires that a class may be created only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Rule 23(b)(3) provides that a class action may be maintained if,
in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a),
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the find-
ings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually control-
ling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature
of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or
against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concen-
trating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
25. Rule 23(b)(1)(B) provides that a class action may be maintained if, in addition
to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), see supra note 24, separate actions by or
against individual members of the class would create a risk of "adjudications with
respect to individual members of the class which would as a practical matter be dis-
positive of the interests of the other members not parties to the adjudications or sub-
stantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests." Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(1)(B).
26. Rule 23(b)(2) provides that a class action may be maintained if, in addition to
satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), see supra note 24, "the party opposing the
class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby
making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with re-
spect to the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
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tures of (b)(3) and they avoid-or so they think-the predominance
requirement of the (b)(3) class, as articulated by Justice Ginsburg's
opinion, because that is not required in a (b)(1)(b), and they also pur-
port to get away with some of the notice requirements.
My sense is that if the Rules Committee is going to try to come up
with a response, rather than just try and come up with a response as
they have in the proposed (b)(4) dealing with settlement classes, 7
they've got to look at Rule 23 across the board.
Certainly the dominant tenor of Justice Ginsburg's opinion imposes
a kind of brooding omnipresence of the Fourteenth Amendment, with
her emphasis on the notice provisions. It seems to me that the Rules
Committee has got to look to whether there should be more of a uni-
tary rule with notice requirements across the board, and with greater
attention to opt-outs. Arguably, there needs to be an opt-out provi-
sion for (b)(2) cases as well. We can talk a little later about what the
Amchem opinion means with respect to the role of settlement.
But I think that, given these developments, plus the flight to state
law-we have seen so many of these cases now being brought in state
court-what happens is the cases go to state court and then all of a
sudden they come back. The Supreme Court in Matsushita v. Ep-
stein-I don't think they realized the import of they were doing-said
that "we will give full faith and credit to a state court settlement of a
nationwide class."' But Justice Ginsburg and others said, "Hey, look
at the Fourteenth Amendment." As Mel Weiss points out, the state
courts are not as well equipped as the federal courts in these cases,
they are not up to these cases, they do not have the staff-and the
courts are going to find Fourteenth Amendment problems, and then
the cases are going to come back to federal court. I think the flight to
the state courts is temporary and they are going to wend their way
back to the federal courts.
The question is: What is Rule 23 going to look like? In my 27 years
on the bench, I have never seen an area in as much ferment as this
class action area is, this mass tort and consumer class action area is
now. Some say the solution is Congress. Well, Congress often messes
it up. And so, if the solution is the courts and Rule 23 is the vehicle
for it, keep in mind that Rule 23 has a lot of holes in it. I think it has
got to be looked at not just piecemeal, like with Rule 2-3(b)(4)29 or
27. Fed. R. Civ. P. proposed rule 23(b)(4) provides that class action may be main-
tained if, in addition to satisfying the requirements of Rule 23(a), see supra note 24,
"the parties to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b)(3) for purposes
of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision (b)(3) might not be met
for purposes of trial." Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 23, 117 S. Ct. 352, 353 (1997) [hereinafter Proposed Amendments]; see also
Draft Minutes of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Apr. 18 & 19, 1996, 117 S. Ct.
333, 345-49 [hereinafter Draft Minutes].
28. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
29. See supra note 27.
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with interlocutory appeals,30 but it may be the whole rule has got to be
looked at from square one.
MR. WEISS: It is interesting to me that you have coupled con-
sumer cases with mass tort cases. I just wonder why you equate the
two.
JUDGE BECKER: Simply in terms of the numbers.
MR. WEISS: Oh, so you-
JUDGE BECKER: You are going to say, Mel, that I really know
how to hurt a guy, but Judge Simandle denied certification in a case
with your office in the Ford Motor Ignition cases.3 1
MR. WEISS: Right.
JUDGE BECKER: The GM Truck case,32 the Ford Motor Ignition
case, some of these consumer cases, they are based on warranty law.
But the warranty law differs in the various states. You may have a
whole bunch of different brands of warranty law; you have a whole lot
of different factual patterns.
I just think in terms of the numbers-the parallel is in the numbers,
the millions and millions of plaintiffs, and in terms of the variations in
state law, and very often the variations in factual patterns, including
causation.
MR. WEISS: But Rule 23 is not a rigid rule. It is designed as a case
management tool. You know that creative judges and lawyers can get
together and work out ways to try cases in those kinds of situations.
You can probably group states into, let's say, four or five basic legal
premises that you can present to a jury. Or possibly, you can try the
case with multiple juries.
JUDGE BECKER: I agree.
MR. WEISS: There are a lot of things that lawyers and judges can
do. Why take a situation with millions of people who have been in-
jured and say to them, "There is no effective remedy for you?" Or
why throw it into the hands of a bunch of individual lawyers who are
going to do nothing but create mass cases, which, in my view, are not
much different from class cases in terms of their resolution? Ulti-
mately what happens? A lawyer sits down with a package of cases-
1000, 10,000, 20,000-and settles them for a lump sum, and then di-
vides it up among the clients with no judicial supervision over fees or
30. Fed. R. Civ. P. proposed rule 23(f) provides:
A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from an order of a
district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if
application is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the
court of appeals so orders.
Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at 353; Draft Minutes, supra note 27, at 334.
31. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prod. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332 (D.N.J.
1997).
32. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
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anything like that. He probably takes 40 percent in fees rather than
getting court-awarded fees, and only those victims who are lucky
enough to get into the hands of a lawyer will get any remedy. All the
other people are left with nothing. I do not understand why that is
good, especially if the defendant wants to make amends to all of the
millions who were harmed.
JUDGE BECKER: I would respond by saying, from a point of
pure social utility, I would agree with you. What is at issue is a ques-
tion of legitimacy-the proper role of the federal courts. The question
is-I do not want to use the pejorative of whether or not the federal
courts could be turned into mediation forums because there are a lot
of pros and cons about that. But we have a Rule. The question is
whether a particular action, in this case a particular mass tort action, is
something that is within the competence of the federal courts within
the Rules of Procedure. If the Rules of Procedure-Rule 23, which is
what we now have-does not accommodate that, then we cannot
solve all the problems of the world in the federal courts.
I agree with your premise. Be resourceful. There are a lot of ways
to handle it. There can be state classes (in federal court). There are a
lot of ways to do it. But the answer to your question is: It is simply a
question of legitimacy, and the mission of the federal courts is not to
solve all social problems, even problems which find their ways into the
law courts, but only those which the Rules of Procedure properly vest
within federal judges.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Judge Weinstein, maybe federal
courts should not solve everybody's problem, but it does seem as
though-you get a product that is sold to millions of people, if it is in
fact defective, if people have been hurt, the question then becomes:
How do we provide a remedy in a society that cares, as you said?
After Amchem, the lower courts seem to be saying-with the Ford
Motor Ignition case33 as one recent example-"If you have thirty or
forty states from which the plaintiffs come, it is going to be real hard
to have a class. If you have defenses such as contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, anything like that, they are so individualized, it is
going to be very hard to certify a class."
Under the Rules Enabling Act, it is probably true that the Advisory
Committee-and even Judge Stotler's Standing Committee-proba-
bly cannot do a thing about the federal courts, say, picking the state
with the most interest in the case and saying, "We are going to use
that law," because it appears that the appellate decisions run the other
way. If Congress were going to get into this process, ought Congress
get into it by giving judges the authority to, say, adopt a single rule of
law for a case involving a substantial number of plaintiffs?
33. In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prod. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332 (D.NJ.
1997).
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JUDGE WEINSTEIN: We have to start with what the society
looks like. I wrote, Judge Becker, the article that the Federal Advi-
sory Committee-Judge Kaplan's committee-used in concluding that
they should not use this Rule for torts.34 But I was wrong, because
society is completely different from the society I saw while I was up in
my tower at Columbia. I did not know about all the people who were
out there on the streets of our nation hurting, and I did not fully un-
derstand that our technology and our science are organized on a na-
tional and international scale. The people are hurt on an individual
scale. The whole technology and the whole society that we face call
out for a way of dealing with these problems.
Our Federal Civil Rules are based on the old Rules of Equity. The
Rules of Equity won in the fight over the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. The Rules of Equity provide a very
loose and effective way of meeting new situations, as they have for the
last six hundred years in English and American practice.
You can do anything with the Rules-or almost anything-by inter-
preting them in the light of history and the current needs of society.
And Judge, then Professor, Kaplan never could have predicted that
these were the problems that would arise, just as the Fourteenth
Amendment drafters and the Sherman Act drafters had no idea of all
of the issues that would develop. What you have here is a very loose
set of procedures that have been tightened up over the years, to the
detriment of efficient and fair procedure in the courts, as the Rules
Committee-not the present Rules Committee, but the former Rules
Committees-fiddled around and encrusted them. And now they
propose to encumber them again. There is enough flexibility in these
Rules, and enough jurisdiction, and enough need, to handle these new
class actions of millions of plaintiffs.
So the question is: How do you handle these suits most effectively?
You know Congress is not going to do any good. As Judge Becker
said, if they step in, it is just going to be to create mischief. How do
you handle it?
I have no problem with these cases. I have never had any problem.
I can run down the Rule and conform completely to the Rule and
provide appropriate remedies, with the assistance of counsel. We
have very imaginative and skilled counsel on both sides, fortunately.
They can handle these cases if they are let alone and not told that they
have to address practical problems through abstruse theories of proce-
dure and constitutional law.
Even Justice Ginsburg, who is a brilliant proceduralist, and Judge
Breyer start off their opinions in Amchem by saying, in effect, "Look,
34. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendments
(citing Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9
Buff. L. Rev. 433, 469 (1959-60)).
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we are going through all of this analysis, but we must take care of all
of these problems. Let's see how things work out on a case-by-case
basis. Settlement is something relevant to a class certification, and the
Third Circuit's opinion bears modification in that respect. 35
Cases that have been reversed were those which should not have
been certified, or where there was over-reaching by parties or lawyers,
or where the ethical violations were so patent that somebody had to
step in and say "Stop." But now to step in and say, "We cannot have
any of these kinds of class actions," when the parties need them and
society needs them, because we have not handled the ideological
predicate of some of these Rules, sounds to me quite inconsistent with
the American system and our theory of pragmatically looking at a
problem and developing what tools are best suited to handle it.
I do not have much question, myself, about the constitutional issues.
They have to be handled carefully, of course. Due process has to be
handled carefully, of course. But all of these cases can be adminis-
tered with adequate consideration of those problems without amend-
ing these Rules and without making them more narrow and rigid.
I can say this: Every amendment that you are going to adopt now is
going to be an amendment which will provide more barriers to people
who have been injured. Every amendment is like having a constitu-
tional amendment. If we went into a Constitutional Convention to-
day, we would have far less of our rights protected. If we go into Rule
23 and amend it, we are going to have far fewer rights protected, be-
cause Congress passes on these amendments too. I doubt if the
Supreme Court will adopt a more useful Rule. I like the present Rule
23. It is a great Rule. I can deal with it. Even if the Supreme Court
adopts a useful change, Congress will so modify it when it comes
before that body, as it will, that we are going to end up with a much
more difficult procedural system.
And who is going to be hurt? Not the rich corporations, not the
rich people who can afford to protect themselves. They can take care
of themselves. The poor people will be hurt. The thought boggles the
mind that they have to turn to Mel Weiss for help.
JUDGE STOTLER: Can I jump in with those remarks about the
Rules and try to console Mr. Weiss at the same time?
First of all, judicial discretion is a wonderful thing, and Judge Wein-
stein knows the meaning of that word better than any person I know.
So I say to you to the extent that anybody tries to curb your sense of
justice and judicial discretion they would be foolish.
Having said that, I would like to take a step back with regard to
how this Rules process works. The Rules are a product, as Judge
Weinstein just mentioned, of the Judicial Conference, or the judiciary
35. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. C1. 2231, 2248 (1997); id. at 2252
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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as the third branch, meeting up with the first branch in terms of a Rule
becoming an Act of Congress. In other words, if the person in the
third row two seats over decided that she had a very good idea for a
Rule change, it would ultimately work its way through the process and
to the U.S. Supreme Court, who would present it to Congress by May
1st of some year, say, two years hence, once the Rules Committee has
re-worked it, and then it goes to Congress where, if they don't mess
with it, it becomes law. So this has been explained to me as a very
hopeful way of papering over the differences between how the judici-
ary sees Rules of Practice and Procedure and how the Congress ulti-
mately approves them.
Having provided that general explanation about how a Rule be-
comes law, there is in fact a bill now pending in Congress that imposes
restrictions on class actions in a single accident case. 36 This is the first
time I have seen in a while where they have tried to come up and meet
these issues about choice of law, about venue, national subpoena
power, and all the rest. This is not to say that they can do it better
than the Rules Committees. I do not think they can, and I think we
have our work cut out for us. Maybe later we can talk about some of
the language that has been proposed about those settlement classes.
JUDGE BECKER: Well, two points. First, on the proposed legis-
lation, whether or not Congress can do it better, only Congress can do
it. If you are talking about the legislation that Judge Nangle and the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation have been pressing-
JUDGE STOTLER: Right.
JUDGE BECKER: Obviously under the Commerce Clause, the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation can take over the manage-
ment of state court cases-not just federal cases-and can coordinate
them, consolidate them, and assign them to a particular judge. They
usually have fewer choice-of-law problems in an airplane crash,
although I do not know whether they covered that in the bill.
JUDGE STOTLER: Yes.
JUDGE BECKER: I think that they did in terms of choice of law.
That is an excellent solution, in my view. But those are no longer the
problem. The first mass torts we got into were the air crash disaster
cases. Now they seem like pygmies compared to the problems that we
have now.
But there are some areas that only Congress exercising the Com-
merce power can solve, and a choice-of-law bill or the power to con-
solidate state and federal cases would have to come to Congress.
But what I really would like to talk about is what Judge Weinstein
identified out of the Amchem opinion, what I view as the most prob-
lematic-or at least the most enigmatic-statement in the Amchem
36. Class Action Fairness Act of 1997, S. 254, 105th Cong.
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opinion, and that is Justice Ginsburg's statement that settlement can
be taken into account.37
Now, a word of background. In my GM case,' which was a con-
sumer case-that was the GM truck fire case, the side-mounted gas
tanks that exploded-I held that basically a class is a class is a class,
paraphrasing Gertrude Stein, that in order to have a class you've got
to meet all the requisites, the (a) requisites and the (b) requisites, and
just because the case has been settled, that that is no grounds to ex-
cuse these requirements that are set forth in Rule 23. 3 9 That, of
course, was Third Circuit law, which was then binding in Georgine,
which became Amchem.
Once again, I said you've got to see whether this asbestos class, this
humongous-as Justice Ginsburg described it, this "sprawling""' -
class of somewhere between 200,000 and two million, nobody knows
how many-people presently injured, people who may be injured in
the future, the so-called "futures class"-you have to see whether that
meets the requisites of Rule 23. Whether the class is certified for set-
tlement or trial makes no difference in terms of Rule 23.
Now, Justice Ginsburg in one line of her opinion said, "Settlement
may be taken into account,"41 and it is plain that she said that with
respect to the (b) factors, the management factors, because she was
quite clear that all the 23(a) factors have to be met, even for settle-
ment classes.
Now, my own sense is, for what it is worth, that Justice Ginsburg's
proviso was a compromise. She needed that line to get a couple more
votes on the Court, because it is one line, unexplained, and there is no
indication what it means as to how settlement can be taken into ac-
count. And, to the extent that she gives it with one hand, she takes it
away with the other, not only in terms of the rest of her analysis, but
when she and the six other Justices she had said that predominance-
which is a (b) factor-is critically important, even for settlement
classes.42
Another question I pose is: If you've got to meet the (a) factors-
the (a) factors include, of course, numerosity-it is an interesting
question as to whether we have the obverse problem. The numerosity
requirement is if you've got ten or twenty people, you do not get a
class; it has to be sufficiently numerous. The question is whether it
can be too numerous.
37. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2248 ("We agree with petitioners to this limited extent:
settlement is relevant to a class certification.").
38. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 799-800.
40. Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2249.
41. Id. at 2248.
42. Id. at 2249.
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MR. WEISS: There are cases that hold that classes with twenty,
even eighteen members may be certified.
JUDGE BECKER: Too numerous, okay. But you've got to meet
numerosity, you've got to meet common questions, you've got to meet
typicality and adequacy of representation, which I think are essentially
the same thing. If you have to meet those factors, and if you have to
meet the predominance factors, then I am not sure what is left as to
which settlement classes could differ. The only thing left in (b) is su-
periority. So maybe the fact of settlement bears on superiority. But if
you've got to meet all the (a) factors and you've got to meet predomi-
nance, it seems to me that the superiority factor is irrelevant. You still
have to meet the basic requisites of a class to be certified.
And so I am not sure what she meant and I am not sure how it is
going to play out, and I would be interested if somebody could explain
to me how it is supposed to work.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Judge Weinstein?
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Let me say that Judge Breyer picked up the
same phrase and emphasized it.43 Judge Breyer's opinion, I thought,
was a much more flexible-and from my point of view a more worka-
ble-opinion, in that it made explicit the variations in practice that
could be developed through the Rule.
Let me give you an example, Judge Becker. Without being invidi-
ous, arguably one of the cruelest opinions in years is In re Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Inc.44 That was a case in which the HIV virus was in-
troduced into the bodies of thousands of hemophiliacs, many of them
children, who received vital blood transfusions. A very large percent
of that pathetic population was, as a result, wiped out.
Under District Judge Grady, they worked out a settlement be-
tween-as I recall, the Red Cross and the plaintiffs' class. The survi-
vors and the parents had gone through this horror and were still going
through this horror. All parties were perfectly content to work out an
arrangement that met the needs, to the extent that they could be
met-discounted by a whole variety of factors I will not get into-of
this suffering plaintiff class and the defendants.
The Japanese had done it. They had gotten down on their hands
and knees and apologized to the class. We do not do that, but it would
probably be a good thing to add as a subdivision of the Rule that if all
other compensation methods fail, get down on your knees and thank
God that you have not suffered and apologize to those who have been
injured. But the Japanese worked it out, and in France and other
countries they also worked out forms of compensation. A similar set-
tlement was proposed here, in this country.
43. Id. at 2252 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
44. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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Now, the Court of Appeals held that the settlement class could not
be certified because it did not meet the requirements of Rule 23.4-
Why doesn't it meet Rule 23? There are fifty states here, and each
one of them has a different rule of substantive law, and you cannot
settle this because you could have all these sub-classes based on differ-
ent substantive law. And the claims are poor anyway-you may think
that there is something to them, but we are telling you they are no
good.
How does a settlement take place? Well, a case gets settled the way
it did in the Manville case.' There I had somewhat the same prob-
lem, with fifty different states' laws governing the contribution issue.
The parties got together and said, "As part of these settlements we are
going to say that the law is so and so." And what is wrong with that?
What is wrong with the parties saying that "in order to dispose of this
we are going to give up some of our rights under the laws of State X,
Y, and Z, and you are going to give up some of your rights under A, B,
and C, so that we can get a settlement with a consensus about the
substantive law that takes care of all these people before they are all
dead"? What's wrong with that?
That is where settlement is important. The settlement itself changes
the parameters of the dispute. It takes it from a state-by-state basis
and puts it in the context of the national and international scientific,
medical, and technological community.
The same thing is true with a number of other factors that are in-
volved. Once you can take hold of one of these cases and give it
meaning in terms of what the people's needs are, and what industry's
and society's needs are, settlement becomes an important factor in
changing the whole nature of the case.
If Exxon is settling a class action in Alaska involving an oil spill and
as part of the settlement it gives money to the State of New York
because the people in the State of New York are not going to be able
to enjoy the same beauty in Alaska, I guess the Court of Appeals
would say, "That is absurd; you cannot have all of that, because the
New York law and the Alaska law and other states' laws are all differ-
ent." But all the people in the national community are suffering as a
result of that spill. If the parties work out something that is sensible
and that aids everybody-the defendants and the plaintiffs and the
community-and does it in a way that does not violate anybody's due
process, why should we say, "You haven't crossed all the t's, you ha-
ven't dotted all the i's, you haven't gone through all the detailed, fine
procedures?" Appropriate procedures under the Federal Rules do
45. Id at 1304.
46. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 878 F.
Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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not prevent that. None of our civil procedures prevent good sense
and a pragmatic approach to the needs of society.
Federal courts with Article III judges are one of the few organiza-
tions in our society independent enough to look at all these problems
and say, "Yes, it can be done." Nobody has taken away our power.
As far as I'm concerned, if the parties come before me with a settle-
ment that is sensible, and it in some way can fit within the parameters
of our flexible Rules, why shouldn't I go along with it when it helps
the community and helps us get along as people that have to live to-
gether in a contentious and difficult time? Why should we make more
trouble for these people by ideological positions that are not based on
our society's needs?
Justice Ginsburg is one of the best proceduralists in our country
today, I believe. She studied and wrote on the Swedish procedure, she
taught procedure at Columbia, and she is very smart. And so is Judge
Breyer. I do not think they threw away our class action protections.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Debra?
MS. TORRES: One of the things I think this decision turns on is
that the Court was not satisfied that it really had a settlement among
and between all the parties.
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Of course. It was a terrible settlement.
Anybody with any sense would know looking at it that the particular
settlement in Amchem should not be permitted to stand. It was
terrible.
MR. WEISS: Let me just tell you the contrary argument to what
you said, Judge Weinstein, even though I agree with your position.
But we should at least understand what those like Professor John Cof-
fee are saying.47 Professor Coffee is saying that if you have all these
roadblocks as a plaintiff's lawyer in a litigation context, then you are
disabled from negotiating a fair and reasonable resolution. If the de-
fenses to the class, the causation problems, et cetera, are so disabling
that they somehow impair your ability to get a fair resolution for eve-
rybody who might otherwise get a fair resolution if they were left to
bring their own cases in their own jurisdictions, he argues that in such
cases, there is an incentive for the plaintiff's lawyer to sell out by set-
tling a case on a class-wide basis for a fee and, in effect, destroying the
rights of individuals who might otherwise get better results on an indi-
vidual basis. That is the argument that he makes, at least, in part.
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: He is much more sophisticated than that.
47. John C. Coffee, Jr. is a professor at Columbia University School of Law, and
he testified as an expert witness for objectors at the settlement hearings in Georgine v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). In the area of class actions, he
authored Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 Colum. L. Rev.
1343 (1995), and The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technology of Collu-
sion, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 851 (1995).
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MR. WEISS: Now, I think that position is wrong on a lot of differ-
ent levels. We on the plaintiff's side have many different ways to
frighten a defendant into a level playing field. We may have some
difficulties on the class issues, but there are other resources that we
can bring to bear. And, if we get by that hurdle of the class issue,
there is a major threat to the defendant. I think that Professor Coffee
understates and misunderstands the power we have at that negotiating
table.
But more important than all of that is the fact that before approving
settlement of a class action, the judge is required to conduct a fairness
hearing. A notice goes out and any class member who wants to object
to the fairness or adequacy of the settlement has the right to come in
and do so. Then, following the hearing, a judge makes findings as to
the fairness of the settlement. So, as opposed to almost any other
kind of litigation, you have many levels of protection in this process to
insure the fairness of the result.
If the judge is satisfied that the lawyers are experienced and the
settlement was negotiated at arm's length, and if the class members
are given the right to come in and register objections where they de-
sire, and the court has the ultimate decision as to whether the settle-
ment is fair, reasonable, and adequate, and how much the fee should
be-which is a tremendous control over the lawyers, and you know
that-I do not see the problems that people like Professor Coffee pur-
port to see.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Mel, you are now moving us to an-
other issue I wanted to be sure we got to, which is an issue Judge
Weinstein has written about, which is the ethics of settling mass
cases.' Let's go to Georgine, to use Judge Becker's version of the
case, or Amchem, the Supreme Court's version. As I remember-I
may have the numbers wrong-this is a case where all of the hundreds
of thousands of asbestos cases get put before Judge Weiner, so he's
got a huge, huge burden facing him.4 9 The plaintiffs and defendants
engage in negotiations and they come up with a settlement proposal,
and they file their suit and the settlement proposal at the same time.
They have also contacted their insurers and told them they fied a suit
for insurance coverage at the same time. So what we have is a triple-
we have a suit being filed, we have a settlement being proposed, and a
suit against the insurers to make sure they cover.
48. See Weinstein, Ethical Dilenmas, supra note 2; see also Jack B. Weinstein, In-
dividual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations,
and Other Multiparty Devices (1995) [hereinafter Weinstein, Individual Justice]; Jack
B. Weinstein, The Future of Class Actions in Mass Tort Cases, in ALI-ABA Course of
Study: Civil Practice and Litigation in the Federal Courts 333 (1998); Jack B. WVein-
stein, Mass Tort and Class Actions, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 581 (1997).
49. The reference is to the Georgine action in the district court level. See Georgine
v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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It turns out that the plaintiff's lawyers are supposed to get $200 mil-
lion, or thereabouts, for the current claims-that is, the people who
are currently suffering injury-and it looks as though to some of us-
it looked to me when I read it-like they traded off the futures, the
unknown plaintiffs, so that those plaintiffs would receive very little in
terms of the overall settlement.
Now, Judge Weiner sends the case to another judge to hold the fair-
ness hearing. The judge has a trial. Now there are all kinds of groups
coming in complaining, saying, "It isn't fair." You get the nation's
leading ethics experts lined up on both sides of this, some of them
saying, "This stinks what happened here, these lawyers got paid off on
their existing claims, and what do they care about people they do not
know and cannot identify, and they created a sham, a litigation system
for the future that will provide very little."
Now, Mel, you have been involved in a lot of class actions. When
you see something set up this way, doesn't it look bad to the public?
Even though a district judge said, "I am going to approve it; I made
some findings about it," it looked bad, didn't it?
MR. WEISS: It looked terrible. I foresaw the result because of the
way the thing looked. The problem is that when it gets into the hands
of judges at the appellate level, they are offended by it, but they do
not want to express it in those terms, so they write in other terms, and
sometimes they are writing about things that they really do not under-
stand with the nuances that the practitioners understand it.
JUDGE BECKER: You're getting even now, Mel.
MR. WEISS: I am talking about the Supreme Court. I have no
problem with your decision. It is the Supreme Court. That is what I
am living with now.
But I just want to add something to Judge Stotler's comments. I
have heard-and I do not know if this is going to happen-that a Sen-
ate Committee is considering holding hearings on class actions per se
and whether or not they are viable in our society and how they should
be fashioned. Somebody told me as recently as yesterday that these
hearings could get started within six months.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Debra, Mel raised an issue and I am
going to ask you about the ethics of this on the defense side. I mean,
didn't this look like the asbestos defendants were essentially paying
the lawyers off to get out of the case, with some recovery for the cur-
rent claimants at the expense of the future claimants?
MS. TORRES: You can certainly look at it that way. As I said
before, what a corporate defendant in this situation is looking for is
certainty, and when you have injuries arising out of asbestos exposure
or other kinds of things where there is a long latency period, getting
certainty is very, very difficult. It is not even as clear as it might be,
say, for certain other kinds of mass tort situations. And so one way to
read the facts here is that people decided to deal with that very diffi-
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cult problem of uncertainty on latent claims by valuing them not very
highly.
Part of the difficulty, I think, when you look at the whole thing is
that there wasn't anyone who you could say was really representing
the interests of the future claimants in fashioning the settlement. I
think Judge Breyer points out in his dissent in Anchem that you could
view the consideration that the future claimants got in the settlement
as being more valuable than might be apparent because one of the
things they got is a tolling of the statute of limitations. But it is diffi-
cult to say that that is really fair when there was nobody who was
really negotiating on their behalf because there was no differentiation
between members of the class, between people who had already been
exposed and people whose symptoms had not yet developed and so
forth. And that, I think, is a real problem.
The major reason for settlement from the defense side is the need
to get certainty. When you have the kind of torts where it is difficult
to value claims that have not yet been asserted, you really need to
have procedural safeguards in place so that a court can be confident
that the kind of consideration that is given to those future claimants is
fair.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Judge Becker, I am going to switch
back to you, if I can. I should say this about Judge Becker, just so you
know it. Judge Becker and I go back a long time. The thing I love
about Judge Becker is he always cites, along with his cites to Judge
Weinstein, Dan [Capra], Mike Martin, and me, and our Federal Rules
of Evidence Manual.5"
JUDGE BECKER: In fact, one time I cited you [Judge Weinstein]
and I did not cite him [Professor Saltzburg]. That was the last time.5"
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: And when he disagrees with you, he
says, "For a wrong view.. ." and he cites you. But it is a lot better to
be cited than not cited. That is a rule of life.
MS. TORRES: No such thing as bad publicity.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: That is really true.
But, Judge Becker, I want to go back. I actually thought for a mo-
ment, after reading your opinion in Georgine again and reading Jus-
tice Ginsburg's, that I understood what she was doing. I do not
necessarily think the two of you are in disagreement. I want to throw
out an idea and then ask you a question.
Here is my idea. I believe that, consistent with your opinion in
Georgine, that a district judge could-forgetting future claimants for
the moment-approve class settlements.
50. Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra. Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual (7th ed. 1998).
51. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 634 n.17 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing
Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 48).
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JUDGE BECKER: I think sprawling classes are done. If it is a
sprawling class, whatever a sprawling class is, I think they are "out of
here."
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Let me just try out an idea on you.
The question is: Could you try the case? Now, Judge Weinstein gave
us an example. He said, "Suppose the defendants say, 'We will agree
that one state's law ought to govern.' If they were to say that, you
could try that case."
JUDGE BECKER: I think that is probably all right. I was on the
panel in the School Asbestos cases.2 Everybody said, "It's crazy,
given the different laws of fifty states," and I was the one who from
the bench encouraged the lawyers to come up and see if they could
identify a pattern, and they identified four patterns. We said, "That's
okay."53 My sense is that the future of class actions in mass torts and
other big cases is going to rest largely with the lawyers, how creative
and resourceful the lawyers are, and how much homework they are
willing to do. The Milberg Weiss firm, for example, will do a fifty-
state survey. If you can demonstrate that there are really only three
or four patterns, explain to the judge how this case can be tried on a
dozen special interrogatories. From my point of view, that is triable. I
said that in GM Truck" and I said that in Georginel5-that if you can
demonstrate that, then that is a case which can be tried and which
meets the class definition within the existing rule.
Now, that is not always going to be the case, and that is going to be
a battleground. I never thought of that before, but it sounds okay to
me, if the lawyers can stipulate to that.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: If I read you correctly, what you are
insisting upon is that the lawyers at settlement must have thought
about every sub-class and all damages as if they would have to try the
case. And if they did not think this through, then you could not have
a valid settlement because a valid settlement required the informa-
tional equivalent of what you would have to know at trial.
That brings me to my question. If that is so-and I think, for me,
that was a really powerful analysis-it did not preclude the kind of
creativity Judge Weinstein was talking about at all, except as to one
sub-class-these future plaintiffs, the unknown group. You could ap-
point a lawyer or you could appoint several lawyers. If I were going to
appoint a caring lawyer, I would pick Sol Schreiber. 6 I would say,
52. In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986).
53. Id. at 1010.
54. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 799 n.22 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at
1010).
55. 83 F.3d at 627 & n.13 (citing In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d at 1010).
56. Sol Schreiber is a partner at Milberg Weiss and has been a special master in
many famous class action cases. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig.,
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"Sol, you represent them." But I have a feeling he would come back
and say, "I cannot put a number on the table for these people. I
mean, I just can't. There is no way to do it."
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: No. That is, in my opinion and with all due
respect, completely wrong. Your evidence analysis is impeccable, but
your conclusion is wrong. We had in the Manville case' just that
problem, and it was settled, and it had to be settled. Now, Judge New-
man properly reversed after the first settlement. 8 He said to me, the
trial judge, "You have not taken enough of the possible sub-classes
into account."59 We did that and then we resettled it again on a differ-
ent basis.60
What about future claims? They had to be taken care of. Do we
know what is going to happen in the future? No. So what did we do?
We appointed a Rule 706 panel6' and said, "Go out and make the
necessary predictive studies." The panel came in and said, "Judge, we
think that between 350,000 and 600,000 people will be claiming asbes-
tos-related injuries up to the year 2050; we think the assets will be so-
and-so; the parameters are so-and-so; and a reasonable decision based
upon the variables is such-and-such."
It has to be done. To think that you cannot take care of future cases
in our society is wrong. When God laid down the Ten Command-
ments, that was a contract to bind many, many generations. We are all
bound by them.
That was a settlement because the people could have rejected it.
MR. WEISS: And if you do not do it, they may wind up with
nothing.
JUDGE BECKER: The question is how you take care of them.
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That is the question, how do you take care
of them-
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: How do you do it?
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: -and what is the process by which you
take care of them? How do you negotiate so that the various groups
that are involved arrive at a reasonable amount?
910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 F.R.D.
173 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
57. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 878 F.
Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
58. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 982 F.2d
721, 750-51 (2d Cir. 1992) (reversing In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 120
B.R. 648 (E. & S.D.N.Y., Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
59. 982 F.2d at 739-44.
60. 878 F. Supp. at 481.
61. Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that a -court may on its
own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nomina-
tions. The court may appoint any expert witnesses ... of its own selection." Fed. R.
Evid. 706(a).
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The parties and the attorneys have to be kept in check by the judge
as to fees, as to sub-classes, and as to a variety of other things. One of
the difficulties with the present Rules as they are interpreted-not
necessarily the way they should be interpreted, but as they are inter-
preted-is that when the settlement comes to the trial judge it is up or
down. The trial judge cannot modify it. He or she cannot say, "Go
back. This part of it looks good to me. That part is just not going to
fly, so go back and renegotiate it." It is up or down. So when a judge,
as in the asbestos cases, gets a settlement that has good and bad parts,
it is a "take it or leave it" situation. That is a problem that I think has
to be dealt with.
Realistically it is dealt with. It was dealt with in the Manville cas62
and in the Agent Orange case 63 as well as in other cases by the judge
getting involved. The extent to which the judge should be involved in
the class action settlement process raises difficult ethical and proce-
dural questions. But at some stage some people have to get involved
who are assigned to represent groups, and some impartial people have
to get involved who have no interest whatsoever except that of soci-
ety-usually the judge, but not always.
Those things can be worked out. They have to be worked out with
respect to future claimants, or industry and society cannot go on with
their work. We cannot deal with today's problems unless we work out
some solution that takes care of the problems that are coming down
the pike. Whether it is environmental or whether it is tort class ac-
tions, or whether it is asbestos, industry has to be taken care of so it
can go ahead and do its work and these people in the future have to
be assured that they've got a good deal. That is a very difficult
problem.
It is not, however, going to be solved by abstract ideological views
of how Rule 23 should be formed. There are very difficult practical
problems. We have not really addressed in a scholarly way how these
things work: How does bankruptcy work compared to class actions?
What is the cost? What should we be doing here? Who should have
what responsibility? Should we have groups of judges? Should we
send related cases to one judge to help settle them? These are the real
problems we have and we ought to address them.
I do not think we are going to get anyplace by talking about changes
in semicolons and subdivisions of Rule 23 because there is a difficult
process here, and it cannot be handled, in my opinion, by abstract
rulemaking.
JUDGE STOTLER: Well, Judge Weinstein, even though I am sup-
posed to be here not even with a district judge hat on, but with the
62. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 878 F.
Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995).
63. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718 (E.D.N.Y. 1983),
affd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Chairman of the Standing Committee hat, I think these remarks have
really pointed out to me part of the wisdom and the genius of the
Amchem decision, which I had never thought to praise in this light
before.
You will recall that the Supreme Court-and actually, I think, Judge
Becker's opinion set up this analytical framework-skipped over a lot
of very serious, significant constitutional issues to talk about what is
appropriate for settlement, which is exactly what you are talking
about in the procedures that we use to get there, to do justice, and to
do it within the rule of law. In Justice Ginsburg's footnotes, where a
lot of little gems are hidden in many legal opinions, she notes that if
certification were really not going to be the dispositive issue of the
appeal, the Supreme Court would have to look hard-and this was
intimated at the Third Circuit level-at jurisdiction, at standing, at a
whole host of problems that maybe we do not want to think about or
do not need to think about in order to get to the resolution that can be
achieved, as you pointed out, within Rule 23 as it currently appears.'
Having said that, I do want to say that there is a proposal on the
table that is probably going to have to be changed, because that pro-
posal would change Rule 23 to make it read as follows: "The parties
to a settlement request certification under subdivision (b)(3) for pur-
poses of settlement, even though the requirements of subdivision
(b)(3) might not be met for purposes of trial." '
This gets back to what Judge Becker pointed out, which is that the
Court is saying that a settlement is relevant in the Anchem opinion,
but then, on the other hand, it says "we have to talk about adjudica-
tion." So it takes away with one hand what it gives with the other.'6
In short, I think there is a good argument to be made that things can
be worked out, that the procedures that you identify are what we
should be focusing on, and in that sense the Amchem decision really
helps us.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Mel, some people criticize class ac-
tions. They often think of them as blackmail devices, that lawyers are
combining all these claims because when you combine them all it puts
a lot of pressure on defendants to settle, and they say the whole pur-
pose of a class action is settlement. Well, you and I know from a lot of
cases, Stringfellow6 7 being one-this is a case that Mel Weiss's firm
had in California-that there are alternatives to class actions, and they
end up being as cumbersome, if not more so, and as expensive.
MR. WEISS: Far more expensive than litigating a class action.
64. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2244 n.15 (1997).
65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. proposed rule 23(b)(4). supra note 27.
66. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67. See United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986).
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PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Why don't you describe what
Stringfellow was so that people will get a sense of what alternative to a
class action exists in the mass tort area?
MR. WEISS: Stringfellow was a toxic waste dump in Riverside,
California, one of the ten worst Superfund situations in the country.
A personal injury firm signed up four thousand individual clients in
this village near the dump, and came to my firm and said, "We need
help in litigating the case."
We went into the case. We were unaware of the dangers ahead of
us. The case was a horror. We decided not to try the case as a class
action, thinking that it would delay resolution, so we decided to file
four thousand individual cases. This is in state court, by the way. The
defendants immediately served interrogatories requiring eight hun-
dred pieces of information for each one of the four thousand plaintiffs.
The judge ordered plaintiffs to answer all the interrogatories, because
he believed answering all the interrogatories would allow the defend-
ants to get a handle on how much the case was worth globally. In
addition, he decided we should have test cases, so we had to go
through certain other procedures.
It was necessary to set up a system to organize the large number of
plaintiffs. We appointed a committee to represent the community.
We met with them almost every other week. We hired a proceduralist
to create a due process system so that the committee could act on
behalf of the four thousand claimants in a way that would pass muster
under due process. We had town meetings. We allowed access to the
court for people who did not agree with the settlement, and individual
plaintiffs had the right to exclude themselves from the settlement. My
firm advanced over $20 million in out-of-pocket expenses. We wound
up settling after a nine- or ten-year fight. Even though the settlement
was substantial, under our contingency fee arrangement, we received
only our out-of-pocket expenses and about 50 percent of the value of
our time.
If we had filed that case as a class action, I am confident the claim-
ants would have wound up with more dollars, probably in half the
time, and the lawyers would have done better as well. Now, I appreci-
ate that it is a problem to handle a case like that as a class action
because you have individual exposure and individual causation and all
of that, but there are common questions that could have been handled
on a class-wide basis. We had issues that could have been handled on
a class-wide basis-whether or not there was toxicity, whether there
was escape of toxins, how often the escape took place-and then we
could have engrafted upon those class findings or resolutions individ-
ual recoveries by creating a pot of money, determining that overall the
amount was fair, and then allocating the money under court supervi-
sion in some fashion.
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There are different ways you can handle class litigation without hav-
ing all of the issues resolved in the class action. I would just conclude
by asking Judge Becker to keep an open mind as to whether classes
which are massive in terms of numbers of members cannot be re-
solved this way.
If you have a ten million-person class and there is one person who
winds up objecting-one person-and the person appeals and ties up
the whole situation for a year or two, why can't the court say, "Even
though there are ten million people in this class, if 9,999,999 say it's
okay, then I will find it fair." What's wrong with that?
JUDGE BECKER: As a practical matter, the only cases that get
knocked out are the ones where there is a substantial objection. For
example, let's take Weiss-no relation, I take it, to you-v. Mercedes-
Benz.68 That was a consumer case. Your office handled it. You han-
dled it personally.
MR. WEISS: Right.
JUDGE BECKER: And, unlike in the GM Truck case,69 you nego-
tiated more than coupons, you negotiated monetary relief. At least if
people did not want to use those coupons, they could redeem them, or
whatever.
MR. WEISS: Right, and they did.
JUDGE BECKER: Now, my recollection is that there were three
or four objectors in that case, but I approved that.
MR. WEISS: Exactly.
JUDGE BECKER: I think I delivered a bench opinion, if I am not
mistaken, right after the hearing.
MR. WEISS: Right after GM Truck.
JUDGE BECKER: The fact is that in that scenario you are always
going to have a few dissidents, a few people who are unhappy. The
cases that get knocked out are when there are a substantial number of
objectors with a discrete interest who are counseled. But I am not
advocating an upper limit on numerosity.
MR. WEISS: Okay.
JUDGE BECKER: If you've got common questions, the dam-
ages-it is going to happen a lot in the consumer cases-can be
worked out administratively.
MR. WEISS: Right.
JUDGE BECKER: I have an open mind.
MR. WEISS: Because what Justice Ginsburg said is, "The Commit-
tee's warnings,"-she is talking about the Rule 23 Advisory Commit-
tee's Note in 1966-"however, continue to call for caution when
individual stakes are high and disparities among class members
68. Weiss v. Mercedes-Benz of N. America, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 1297 (D.NJ. 1995).
69. In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
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great."7 I think what she is saying is, "There is a large number of big
claims out there that are better handled as individual claims; why sac-
rifice those claims in a class setting that cannot accommodate them
appropriately?" But I argue that you can accommodate even big
claims because an allocation process can take place in a fair manner.
JUDGE BECKER: I think so. And the hot item ultimately before
Judge Stotler's Committee is not with respect to the big claims. I
think there was a proposal before the Rules Committee that would
have knocked out the big claims. That is, it would have said, "Well, if
there is an alternative way, let them go the alternative way, not by the
class." That proposal went nowhere. That is history.
I think the proposition that you advance, Mel-that if people with
big claims want to litigate them as a class, that is okay-I agree with
that. The problem is in a proposal before Judge Stotler's Committee,
with respect to the little claims, there is a kind of cost/benefit analy-
sis-what has been described as the "it ain't worth it" kind of case-
where if there are a bunch of little claims and you do a cost/benefit
analysis, and you find out that it will cost more to defend or litigate
those claims than the people will get, then the class action should not
be certified.7
Mr. Thomas Willging from the Federal Judicial Center is here. Mr.
Willging did a study in which he surveyed three districts over a period
of ten years.72 He found out that in those districts the average recov-
ery for class action plaintiffs was somewhere between $300 and $500. 7 3
So the argument came right in, "Well, why do we want to bother with
those cases?"
If I may use the supreme affectation of an appellate judge, "speak-
ing only for myself," I think that precluding class actions for these
types of claims would be a terrible mistake. One of the reasons that
we have class actions is if you've got a bunch of little guys who cannot
litigate their claims individually, then you should let them aggregate
their claims if the convenient way is to do it in a class. I hope the
Committee will not proceed on that proposal. Where is that proposal,
Alicemarie?
JUDGE STOTLER: Well, you have given me a good opportunity
to drop a footnote. First of all, the people who write the Rules, as I
said, are the advisory committees, and I have the honor of serving on
the oversight coordinating committee, called the Standing Committee
70. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2246 (1997).
71. Fed. R. Civ. P. proposed rule 23(b)(3)(F) provides an additional consideration
for (b)(3) analysis: "whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies
the costs and burdens of class litigation." Proposed Amendments, supra note 27, at
352; see also Draft Minutes, supra note 27, at 335-36.
72. Thomas E. Willging et al., Empirical Studies of Class Actions in Four Federal
District Courts: Final Report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (1996).
73. Id. at 13.
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on Rules of Practice and Procedure. But we know that the Civil Rules
Advisory Committee, meeting in a couple of weeks, will be back on
the so-called "it just ain't worth it" provision, and it is still for the
Committee to decide if they want to go forward with this.
The "it ain't worth it" proposal presents a deep philosophical split
about the probable relief measured against the burdens of class action
litigation.
On the one hand, there is the concern that this is exactly what the
private attorney general theory is all about-that it is $100 per con-
sumer but there's ten million consumers involved; it is surely going to
be worth it in the aggregate. On the other hand there are the obvious
costs and burdens of the class action litigation.
Some have argued that what is really going on vith this proposal is
a matter of substantive law, because it essentially provides that certain
claims can never be brought. The argument proceeds that if Congress
wants to pass something about private attorneys general and recovery
of costs and attorney's fees, that is their province, and the Rules pro-
cess should not be invoked for that kind of substantive policy choice.
But the "it ain't worth it" proposal is still with us. I have some
doubt that it is necessarily going to go anywhere, for a lot of the rea-
sons that the panel has already hit on. These are tough questions.
QUESTIONS & ANSWERs
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: I am going to exercise the preroga-
tive of what little power I have, and open the floor now to your com-
ments and questions. Here are the only two things I would ask of you.
Since we all come from different places-some of you are from New
York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C., and California-some of you
know each other very well and some of us, oddly enough, know some
of you from different places. But if you have a question or comment,
tell us who you are so we all know. And please, if you want to direct it
to a particular member of the panel, that is great, and then anybody
else on the panel can comment.
JUDGE BECKER: They should also tell us if they are a class rep-
resentative, I think.
QUESTION [FROM SOL SCHREIBER74 ]: My name is Sol
Schreiber. My greatest treat is that I taught here for fifteen years, and
it is a pleasure to be back here.
I not only serve under the distinguished Chair of the Standing Com-
mittee, but I am the liaison for the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.
On the "it ain't worth it" provision, at the last meeting, the provision
was knocked out and sent back to the Committee to reexamine it to
74. See supra note 56.
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see if they could come back with something that would meet with
some approval.
I would like to take the liberty of speaking to Judge Becker, be-
cause he and I go back about forty years. We went to the same small
law school and that is where we learned all the things that get things
confused today. But seriously, Judge, when you wrote the Georgine
case-and it has been talked about considerably-you chose at the
end of the case to suggest that there were ways of resolving mass torts,
but you thought the Advisory Committee should come up with the
proposal.75 As you know, the Advisory Committee chose to wait for
the Supreme Court to come back with a proposal.
As I read Justice Ginsburg's opinion, she raises three fundamental
problems: One is adequate representation; the second is the problems
of case management caused by sub-classes; and the third is the diffi-
culty of protecting those with future claims.76 With that in mind, as
well as the possibility that you may write on this somewhere along the
line-and, please, do not suggest to the Advisory Committee that we
change Rule 23 entirely because we have worked on this-
JUDGE BECKER: Judge Weinstein couldn't sleep. I wouldn't
want to do that.
QUESTION [FROM MR. SCHREIBER]: We have worked on it
for six years now and we have only tinkered with it. Can you imagine
how many years it would take if we had to rewrite it?
In light of what Justice Ginsburg said, and in light of the fact that
you still are vitally interested in this subject, would you share with us
some of your thoughts on how a class action like that in Georgine
might ever satisfy Justice Ginsburg's concerns?
JUDGE BECKER: Let me say this. I do not think that you have
fully characterized Justice Ginsburg's opinion. The sinews of the
holding, or the fodder for the holding, were the facts of Georgine.
Under the facts of Georgine, I think there is no way that there could
be, in her view and the view of six other Justices, a valid class.
I did not get a chance to follow up on Judge Weinstein's comments
about how we take care of these people. Let's talk about the futures.
Well, many of the futures in Georgine were in the so-called "Califor-
nia mesothelioma" class. Now, mesothelioma is a very scary disease
because somebody can have been exposed to asbestos thirty years ago
and thirty years later they show up with mesothelioma, which will kill
them in six months. But nobody knows who is going to get it, which
people are going to get it, how long they are going to last.
There was a whole group of California mesothelioma plaintiffs who
said, "Look, we don't want to be lumped in with the rest of these
people in some kind of ADR solution where you get X dollars or Y
75. Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1996).
76. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249-52 (1997).
[Vol. 661688
CLASS ACTIONS AND MASS TORTS
dollars. We want a jury trial." Well, can you take care of those folks?
Yes. You take care of them in a separate class, probably not in a sub-
class.
Justice Ginsburg used the term "sprawling class."' I do not think
there is any way that that particular class, as it was defined by the
District Court in Georgine, could survive under anything that you can
sensibly do to Rule 23, having in mind the Supreme Court's very
trenchant message about the due process problems that inhere in ade-
quate representation for such a sprawling class, and notice to the class
when many of the members are unknown and unknowable. The prob-
lem with notice, as they saw it, is how do you give notice to people
who do not know they have a disease? If they read in the Los Angeles
Times, "If you were exposed you may get mesothelioma," basically
the claimants objecting to the settlement were arguing, "That is not
enough notice."
So if your question is, "How is the Georgine or other similar sprawl-
ing classes saved under Rule 23?" I think the answer is no, they can-
not be.
But that does not mean I view Amchem as the death knell of class
actions. I think class actions are alive and well and ought to be. Eve-
rybody gives GM Truck the rap for Georgine, but the fact of the mat-
ter is that GM Truck was the very first court of appeals opinion that
expressly dealt with the issue of settlement classes.7 A lot of others
assumed it was okay, and they are quoted as saying they approved
them. But no other opinion ever had addressed the question of settle-
ment class in terms of-I do not want to pat myself on the back and
say it was scholarly-but at least in terms of addressing the issue.
And Georgine said, "Yes, it's okay, but it's got to meet the 23(a) and
23(b) qualifications."79
I believe that there are plenty of cases that meet the requirements
of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) in which settlement classes are legitimate and
proper. There are cases that can be tried within the framework of fifty
states, even if they are diversity-based mass torts, because you can
break the law down into four or five or six patterns and so forth. And
obviously, the courts are going to have to be much more attentive to
the need for sub-classes if there is any potential conflict among class
members, and so forth.
So I think that there are going to be plenty of cases in which settle-
ment classes will be appropriate and proper. I think there are going to
be some cases in which they are not.
Now, when I talked about other solutions, one of the things I said
was to quote Judge Weinstein. I cited to a book by Judge Weinstein,
77. Id at 2249.
78. See In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig.,
55 F3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995).
79. Georgine, 83 F.3d at 624-25.
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where he was talking about congressional solutions.80 But we are a
little skeptical as to whether Congress will ever do anything sensible.
If Congress were to solve the asbestos problem by legislation and
some kind of compensation scheme, it would probably be better than
what we have now.
One of the things that I mentioned was state classes. Now, there
are a lot of them coming out. State classes have the advantage, at
least, of avoiding the choice-of-law problem. If they are state classes,
it is all under the law of one state, so you do not have the choice-of-
law problem, you have a smaller number, it is more manageable in a
lot of ways, and so forth.
I guess my answer is that class actions are or should be alive and
well, but not everything after Amchem is going to survive.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: We have Justice Freedman"' from
the state court here in New York who does a lot of these asbestos
cases. You have heard the discussion. I wonder what is your reaction
from the state court perspective?
PARTICIPANT [JUDGE FREEDMAN]: Well, needless to say, we
were somewhat disappointed with the result in the Supreme Court,
although we understand the problems with the class in Amchem. We
are overwhelmed with the asbestos cases in New York courts. We are
getting them in now at the rate of something like two thousand a year.
They are filing two thousand cases a year in my court. That just en-
compasses New York City, although it seems that the jurisdiction of
New York City has expanded tremendously. But we are getting a
huge number. While I have done mass consolidations, I've done com-
mon issues trials, I've tried every different thing, they just keep com-
ing, and they're very hard to resolve.
What we have, though, is individual lawyers have, in effect, created
their own settlement classes with individual defendants. So I guess
you have de facto resolutions. Certain plaintiff's lawyers, the ones
who have most of these cases, have agreements, what they call admin-
istrative agreements, with some of the many defendants, and it works
out that way.
Asbestos is unique-or if not unique, it is special-in the sense that
you have a huge number of defendants, you have different ailments,
you have a class that does not seem to be finite into the future, and
you have this tremendously long latency period.
JUDGE BECKER: And some of them are smokers and some of
them were not smokers, and that kind of problem too?
80. See id. at 634 n.17 (citing Weinstein, Individual Justice, supra note 48).
81. The reference is to New York State Supreme Court Judge Helen E. Freedman,
who has worked on the state asbestos cases. See In re New York City Asbestos Litig.,
572 N.Y.S.2d 1006 (Sup. Ct. 1991), remanded, modified, aff'd in part, and rev'd in part,
593 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 1993).
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PARTICIPANT [JUDGE FREEDMAN]: Well, that does not af-
fect mesothelioma, but it does lung cancer. Just to give you an exam-
pie, I have seventy living mesothelioma cases on trial in November,
and those of you know what it is like-I mean, it has just become
massive.
So we've got to have some solution other than the way we are doing
it. That is the bottom line. The lawyers are fashioning it, they are
getting around it, but in the end I think that fairness dictates that if we
do not have some kind of class certification, can work out some alter-
native, some common issues approach, something-one of the points
that Mel Weiss made is that it was a disaster out in that California case
that he was involved in.'
I just had a big water main break. We just consolidated and we set
up common issues trials. To me, you do not need class certification if
you are dealing with something that is as concrete as a single accident
case, even if there are a lot of claimants. Perhaps that could have
worked in the California case.
JUDGE STOTLER: But Stringfellow dealt with a site that was a
toxic dump for decades.
PARTICIPANT [JUDGE FREEDMAN]: Oh, I see. So it was not
a single event. So do you think class certification, as opposed to grab-
bing hold and doing a common issues trial, or doing a Daubert hearing
or something like that to focus everybody, wouldn't have done almost
as well?
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: They did a Daubert hearing.
PARTICIPANT [JUDGE FREEDMAN]: And it still didn't work?
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: I was there. It did not resolve the
case. I mean, it might have if the judge had thrown it out, but he did
not.
PARTICIPANT [JUDGE FREEDMAN]: And a class certification
would have been better?
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: I think Mel thinks it would have
been now. Looking back-hindsight makes everybody a lot wiser-I
think that case definitely would have been better resolved as a class
action.
MR. WEISS: The defendants just did not want to make it easier
and the judge did not want to take control, so we were stuck in that
kind of a vortex.
PARTICIPANT [JUDGE FREEDMAN]: So go back to the draw-
ing boards and come up with something for us.
JUDGE STOTLER: Thank you, Helen. That's wonderful.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: I think there is this urge you get,
when you stand in front of a podium in a law school and you teach, to
82. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. String-
fellow, 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986)).
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call on people. Peter Schuck has written about some of these issues
and he is really one of the most knowledgeable people around.83 He
is sitting right in the middle. Peter, what do you want to add?
PARTICIPANT [PROFESSOR PETER SCHUCK]: I have one
observation and then a suggestion. I would be very much interested in
the panelists' response to both the observation and the suggestion.
The observation is that it is very difficult to disagree with Justice
Ginsburg's criticisms of the settlement in Amchem and it is very diffi-
cult to disagree with the concerns she expressed and the fastidious
way she went through the Rule 23 prerequisites.
On the other hand, the question that has to be asked is "compared
to what?" It seems to me her opinion is an example of "the perfect
being the enemy of the pretty good." I say "pretty good" because
there are some safeguards in the class action certification process.
Mel Weiss emphasized the fact that there is a fairness hearing. Now, it
may be that the judge conducted a poor hearing or made improper
findings as a result of that hearing. None of the panelists have said
that, but perhaps that is what they believe.
Judge Weinstein seemed to feel quite strongly that this was a very
unjust settlement. Yet the trial judge in Georgine held this fairness
hearing and concluded that it was just and took into account all of the
criticisms that have been leveled at it by Professor Coffee and others.
But the alternative is to return these asbestos cases to the tort sys-
tem. Mel Weiss has described the tort system in its individual form,
and it is horrendous. There is no justice there for people in that
system.
So what we are really dealing with is a very imperfect class action
mechanism and a very, very imperfect tort system. When one views it
in that light, it seems to me the superiority criterion under Rule 23
may dictate improving class actions in situations in which if we did not
have to consider the alternatives, we would be inclined to reject settle-
ment. So I would like a response to that, or a reaction to that observa-
tion, if I might.
But let me make one suggestion, which I made in an article and still
think has some merit.84 In addition to the fairness hearing, a market
test might be used to evaluate the fairness of a settlement in an
Amchem-type situation. That is, a liberal opt-out provision, such that
you could determine by the behavior of futures as they became pres-
ent claimants, as they learned of their illness and invoked the opt-out
provision, just how fair the settlement was. Now, it seems to me a
judge within his or her power under Rule 23 could insist upon a liberal
83. Peter H. Schuck is a professor at Yale Law School. In the area of class actions,
he has authored The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange
Example, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 337 (1986) and Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist
Perspective, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 941 (1995) [hereinafter Schuck, Mass Torts].
84. See Schuck, Mass Torts, supra note 83, at 964-65.
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opt-out provision as a prerequisite for approving a settlement that
might otherwise be questionable.
Of course, it is also true-and this is the last thing I will say about
this-that insisting upon a liberal opt-out position might queer many
deals.
JUDGE BECKER: What about the breast implant classes? That is
what happened in those cases. Most of the class opted out.
PARTICIPANT [PROFESSOR SCHUCKI: Yes, that is a problem.
But there are problems wherever we look, and it may be that the fair-
est thing is to countenance settlements that might otherwise trouble us
if they contain a liberal opt-out provision, rather than sending people
back to the court system where they will get no justice at all.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Anyone want to take that on?
MS. TORRES: I think, as I recall the facts in Amchem, one of the
things that troubled Justice Ginsburg was the fact that there was a
very strict limitation on the number of opt-outs per year as future
claimants became aware of their claims.' I would suspect that that
provision was something that the defendants insisted on, as a means of
capping their exposure from claims outside the settlement class.
PARTICIPANT [PROFESSOR SCHUCK]: But they might have
backed down on that if that was the price of the settlement. We do
not know.
MS. TORRES: Right. I do not know, and I do not know how much
they could have been pushed in that regard. But I think certainly the
very low number of opt-outs was one of the things that troubled the
Court in Amchem.
JUDGE STOTLER: These creations have given a new meaning to
the word "settlement." That term used to mean some kind of conclu-
sion, and we did not have this administrative tail that went on forever.
I think the lack of finality affects the certainty factor that Debra is
talking about.
I know that the Advisory Committee has spent considerable time
talking about the meaning of representational litigation, with the
thought that perhaps, because of what we might say are broken-down
systems in some regard, we no longer have the ability to accommodate
the one-on-one or we throw these individuals back into the morass
known as the tort system, and so we need to go to some type of repre-
sentational or institutional type of representation.
That cuts against the grain of how this whole panel started, with
Judge Weinstein trying to describe what we regard as the ideal justice
available in our democracy. So there is a need out there for a new and
different way of solving these problems, but it does not necessarily
reside in either a rule-and so far this panel has decried the abilities
of the Congress to put something together. So the invitation is there.
85. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2241, 2251 (1997).
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I think we are trying to work with what we have, but the novelty, the
creativity, just has not evolved enough to where we can say, "Here is
the new solution; here is the new answer."
MR. WEISS: If Amchem had been reversed on fairness grounds
exclusively, or adequacy of representation, it would have been re-
manded, the parties would have gone back into negotiation, and they
would have cured the problem.
JUDGE BECKER: If there is one thing that is perfectly clear in
Justice Ginsburg's opinion-and on this point she affirmed me-it is
that a fairness hearing is not a surrogate for compliance with Rule
23.86 I give the same response to Professor Schuck that I gave to
Judge Weinstein earlier: From the point of view of what is desirable
as a matter of social policy and social utility, it is better to have a
pretty-good-if-not-perfect solution rather than a not-so-hot solution,
or however you put it, Professor Schuck.
What the Supreme Court said, I talked about it in terms of legiti-
macy. I am not trying to put a halo around myself or anybody, for it is
a practical problem and I would like to find solutions to it. But basi-
cally, when I talk about legitimacy, I just mean the question of
whether this is something that a federal court can do within the ambit
of the present Rule 23-not the wonderful new Rule 23 that Judge
Stotler and her Committee are going to give us, but under the ambit
of the present Rule 23.
I think what the Supreme Court said is, "Unless it fits under Rule
23, we just cannot bless it, even though it's a damn shame that we
cannot."
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Professor Howard Fink87 from Ohio
State, who is here with us today, has his hand up. Howard?
PARTICIPANT [PROFESSOR HOWARD FINK]: I think none of
us can ever know what a case means shortly after it is decided. The
great cases, it takes years and much litigation to know what they
mean. So I always ask my students to look in a new case for the most
that it could stand for and the least that it could stand for.
It is possible that Amchem is reaching toward a principle that says
that no person should have his rights decided without controlling-or
at least having the chance to control-their litigation. The Ticor
case,88 which the Court took and then dropped, and a couple of
others, are hinting at that too, that in money damage actions there
cannot be a Rule 23(b)(1) class suit; you cannot use Rule 23(b)(2) in a
money damage situation; and Rule 23(b)(3) is limited-you cannot
86. Id. at 2248-49.
87. Howard P. Fink is a professor at Ohio State University Law School and the co-
author of Federal Courts in the 21st Century: Cases and Materials (1996) (with Mark
V. Thshnet et al.), and Federal Jurisdiction: Policy and Practice (2d ed. 1987) (with
Mark V. Tushnet).
88. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
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have a class bigger than the ability of the plaintiffs to really control
and decide whether they want to be in that litigation. If it gets too big,
it violates due process. If it gets too complex, it may violate due
process.
I am not sure what Amchem ultimately means, but one way of look-
ing at the case is it is the aspect of control that is essential. That would
get back to the original notion of Rule 23, that the plaintiffs ought to
control their own litigation.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: Judge Weinstein?
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: That is an important point. But there are
lots of ways of plaintiffs participating-not controlling. "Control" is a
very strong word because it means blocking everything, because you
do have people who do not want-
PARTICIPANT [PROFESSOR FINK]: Or opting out.
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Well, possibly. But "participating" is a
word that makes sense, and that is a particularly important word in
our democracy. When you have what Mel Weiss did in his Stringfel-
low case 89-setting up committees and working in a way that permit-
ted input from the people-you have something of a model that can
be used in other class actions.
That is particularly true when you take into account the technology
that is available. One of the great things that Sam Pointer9" did was
put everything on these ROM discs. It does not sound like very much,
but what it meant was that attorneys all over the country representing
a few people could participate effectively to some extent in the discus-
sion. And we are now using videocassettes. There is one plaintiffs'
lawyer who sends videocassettes out in the DES cases to clients and
then they can participate in callbacks. And we now have the possibil-
ity of meetings, as we have in our training programs, where people
from different parts of the country can participate via satellite. Judge
Pointer himself answers litigants' questions via e-mail. In Agent Or-
ange, we handled millions of telephone calls and letters.
So there is no necessary contradiction between mass litigation and
effective participation. That kind of participation is enough to prevent
a claimant from thinking that he is being manipulated by others over
whom he has no control. We ought to keep open minds and not put
ideological roadblocks in the way of the kind of development that is
possible, with the brilliant lawyers and heads of corporations that we
have in this country. Don't stop us with an ideology that says -it is all
or nothing" when we have, as you suggest, a development that we
ought to watch and help and nurture.
89. See United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1986); supra note 68
and accompanying text.
90. The reference is to Alabama Federal District Court Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr.,
who oversees the breast implant cases. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prod.
Liab. Litig., 837 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ala. 1993).
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MR. WEISS: But how do you get into a mass case of individual
actions? You have to have a contact with a lawyer. You have to enter
into a retainer agreement. In a class case you do not have to go
through all of those transactions and all those transaction costs. There
is a big difference.
And what makes you think that in a mass case of individual suits the
individuals actually control their litigation? With the case manage-
ment techniques that are invoked today, and are necessary today, the
courts take more control. You wind up in a consolidation with other
cases, multi-district transfers; you have committees appointed. I do
not care what kind of device is used, it de-fangs the ability of the indi-
vidual to control his or her own individual case.
So what you wind up with is limiting the remedies to only those who
are fortunate enough-or unfortunate enough-to get in the hands of
a lawyer, and then they are paying much greater transaction costs, and
there is less control than in a class action where you have all these
built-in protections under Rule 23.
MS. TORRES: I think part of what troubled the Court in Amchem
was not just the question of participation and control, but something
even perhaps more fundamental than that. How do you bind people
and estop them from pursuing claims that they do not even know they
have at the time the settlement is entered into or the time a judgment
is rendered? And how do you ensure that those people who you are
about to preclude from litigating in the future know that they are
about to be precluded, so that they have a chance to come in and
object at the fairness hearing or to opt-out of a class?
By the same token-just to represent the corporate point of view-
allowing people who are absent to come in later and say, "You cannot
bind me to this. I did not know this was going on. I did not realize I
had been exposed. I did not realize I was going to develop lung can-
cer or asbestosis"-allowing those arguments to be made reopens the
uncertainty, a Pandora's box of uncertainty, that deters the defendants
from entering into these settlements in the first place.
The Rules are meant to ensure that people who are not before the
court may be bound by the judgment or by the settlement fairly. I
think that is the problem that the Court is struggling with here.
QUESTION [FROM PROFESSOR NANCY BERGMAN]: My
name is Nancy Bergman. I am currently an assistant professor at
North Carolina Central School of Law and I formerly was associated
with the firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison here in
Manhattan. I am not a stranger to the desire of defendants to resolve
settlements, especially in mass securities litigation class actions or
mass tort actions. We represented Michael Milken in the Drexel
bankruptcy case, so I am familiar with that.
However, on the other hand, I am an idealist. It was very interest-
ing to me when Judge Weinstein talked about the need for lawyers to
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be very creative and for the process to be flexible. You make the as-
sumption, Judge Weinstein, that in fact the due process rights of vari-
ous absentee plaintiffs would be represented by someone at the table.
Quite frankly, there are a lot of big boys at the table who carry a lot of
weight, and they are not necessarily interested in those who are not at
the table. A corporate defendant in a mass class action wants to have
the matter resolved. You have a judiciary that currently has a lot of
seats empty, they are over-burdened, so, with all due respect, they
want to clear their docket. And then you have the plaintiffs and plain-
tiffs' lawyers. There are those named plaintiffs who stand the most to
gain and the plaintiffs' lawyers who are going to collect their fees.
So these absentee people's due process rights may not in fact be
adequately represented, and I think that was a very big assumption
that you made each time you said that we need to be creative and
flexible. I do not disagree with you, but those due process rights are
very, very important constitutional rights and they really have to be
protected for those absent claimants. I do not know that the judiciary
always does that protecting, and the judiciary is the only one at the
table who can.
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: I agree with you. But the men and women
that I see as attorneys are not to be denigrated. There are occasional
misfits, but I really do not see very many of them. The men and wo-
men who are representing these classes are not selling out their cli-
ents. Certainly I guide them and I use special masters and I help them
see sometimes, when they begin to stray, where the road lies. They
are entrepreneurs-they have to make a living, and a good living-
but they are not selling out for fees. And generally-again, with the
give and take of the adversarial system and the other factors that are
at work here-they are doing a decent job for the greatest number of
people out there who need help than would otherwise be helped
under some other system.
So I think it depends somewhat on where you come from. You
came from a very fine firm with an awful lot of lawyers there who had
a bona fide interest in the community. I do not think it is much differ-
ent from what we have generally.
I know you are not doing this, but the point that Mel Weiss made at
the outset about lawyer-bashing has to be taken into account here.
We are members of an honorable profession, and our lawyers are hon-
orable people. I believe that with the guidance, help, and control of
the Rules, judges, and juries, they will do a decent job of representing
their clients.
QUESTIONER [PROFESSOR BERGMAN]: Your Honor, with
all due respect, if I may respond-
JUDGE WEINSTEIN: Of course.
QUESTIONER [PROFESSOR BERGMAN]: I do not disagree
with you. After all, I am a member of the profession. I think the
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question lies in who is your client, and realizing that those who are not
at the table are not necessarily going to be represented.
MR. WEISS: To use Milken as the example-I was on the other
side of you in that-didn't you think that was one of the most hard-
fought cases?
QUESTIONER [PROFESSOR BERGMAN]: I do not disagree
that it was very hard-fought and that the settlement was negotiated in
good faith. However, there were people who were not at the table
and who do not necessarily have the ability to opt-out of the global
settlement, which was reached in bankruptcy-and we have not even
discussed what the ramifications might be in bankruptcy. That is a
whole other area.
I am not saying it wasn't negotiated in good faith and it was not
hard-fought, but there were people who were not at the table whose
rights were unprotected. I am simply conscious of that.
MR. WEISS: All right. If their rights were not represented, that
should have been brought to the attention of the court. There was
plenty of notice in that case. That was one of the most notorious cases
ever. But the lawyers who were at the table representing the interests
that they represented fought tooth and nail. We had the federal gov-
ernment, who was my co-lead counsel in effect, looking over our
shoulder every step of the way. How you can walk away from that
experience-
QUESTIONER [PROFESSOR BERGMAN]: I am not criticizing
the lawyers.
PROFESSOR SALTZBURG: I am going to interject. At this
point it is a good exchange, but I have noticed that what is about to
happen here to all of you at Fordham is what seems to happen to me
at George Washington. My students think, "He'll never end-never."
That is not true. We are going to come to an end, as we do.
I consider it just an honor to have been with the members of the
panel. On behalf of all of the panel members, I would like to thank all
of you who came for your attention, enthusiasm, and participation.
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